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Redistribution Matters: Growth for Poverty Reduction1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the late 1990s the bilateral and multilateral development agencies placed 
increasing emphasis on poverty reduction in developing countries.  This emphasis 
led to the establishment by the United Nations of the so-called International 
Development Targets for poverty reduction.  The achievement of a target requires 
policies, and policies are most effective within an overall, coherent strategy.  A 
poverty target might be achieved through faster economic growth alone, 
redistribution, or a combination of the two.  This paper presents an analytical 
framework to assess the effectiveness of growth and redistribution for poverty 
reduction.  It concludes that redistribution, either of current income or the growth 
increment of income, is more effective in reducing poverty for a majority of 
countries than growth alone. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 Of the many issues central to the development process, few have been 
characterised by the shifts, reversals and re-affirmations that have pledged the analysis of 
the interaction of growth, poverty and inequality. The mainstream literature has not so 
much evolved as fluctuated over the past fifty years.2 
 From the 1950s into the 1970s emphasis was on probable tradeoffs between 
growth and income distribution. In contrast, work in the 1970s sought to identify re-
distributive mechanisms for poverty reduction without hampering growth.3  This was a 
short-lived focus of the literature, reversed with the rise of neo-liberalism and the 
Washington Consensus in the early 1980s. For the latter, growth itself would be the 
vehicle for poverty reduction, achieved through ‘trickle-down’ mechanisms not always 
                                                 
1An earlier version of this paper was presented to the WIDER conference on growth and poverty, 
May 2001.  
2 See Kanbur (1998) for a thorough review. Dagdeviren, van der Hoeven and Weeks (2000) also 
provide review of the literature on growth, poverty and redistribution. 
3 See Chenery, Ahluwalia, et al. (1974). 
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clearly specified. In the last decade, both the neo-liberal analysis and the earlier view of a 
trade-off between growth and equity were challenged by a number of studies.4  
In the late 1990s the bilateral and multilateral development agencies placed 
increasing emphasis on poverty reduction in developing countries.5  This emphasis led to 
the establishment by the United Nations of the so-called International Development 
Targets for poverty reduction.  The achievement of a target requires policies, and policies 
are most effective within an overall, coherent strategy.  By definition a poverty target 
might be achieved through economic growth alone, redistribution, or a combination of 
the two.   
 Setting a specific level of poverty to achieve by a specific date makes comparison 
of redistribution and growth analytically interesting.  The International Development 
Target for ‘head count’ poverty, which we use, was quite specific: 
The International Development Target for well-being [of US one dollar per day 
per head] is a practical measure of absolute poverty.  It is based on an average 
of national poverty lines in poor countries, which reflect people’s ability to 
afford a diet sufficient to meet minimum nutritional requirements…It thus 
represents an internationally agreed operational method of identifying the 
number of people who by any standard have unacceptably low incomes. 
… 
The…target is to reduce by half the proportion of people in developing 
countries living in extreme poverty by 2015.  The base year is 1990… (DFID 
2000, p. 11) 
  Though the target of fifty percent reduction might be narrowly interpreted as 
referring to the developing world as a whole, donor documents treat it as applicable to the 
regional and country levels. It may be that for some countries there is no feasible growth 
                                                 
4 See, Aghion (1999), Alesina (1994), van der Hoeven (2000) 
5The International Development Targets, set by the Social Summit in 1996, are presented and 
discussed in Hanmer and Nascold (2000).  The UK Department of International Development 
officially adopted these targets (DFID 2000, and Goudie & Ladd 1999).  More modest targets 
were set by USAID (USAID 2001).  The new emphasis of the international financial institutions 
on poverty is reflected in the inclusion of poverty strategies in loan agreements (see IMF & 
World Bank 1999).  For a sceptical view, see Cramer (2000).  
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rate, given historical performance, and changes in inequality and resource availabilities 
that would achieve it.  The World Bank warned that such might be the case: 
Progress in reducing extreme poverty during the 1990s was constrained by 
increasing inequality in a few countries that accounted for a large share of the 
world’s poor.  In looking ahead to 2015, continued increases in inequality coupled 
with less than robust growth would imply failure to reach the poverty target for 
developing countries as a group, and in particular substantial increases in the 
number of poor in Sub-Saharan Africa. (World Bank 2001b, p. 7)6 
The World Bank went on to conclude that ‘the alternative [growth] scenarios 
highlight the importance of achieving fast growth, as well as distributing the benefits of 
growth equitably’ (World Bank 2001b, p. 10).7  The same point is made by UK DFID, 
‘without growth the poverty reduction target will not be achieved, but it is not enough on 
its own’ (DFID 2000, p. 11).8   
 Despite the wide-spread recognition that GDP growth should be combined with 
mechanisms of redistribution to achieve the international poverty target, one finds little 
quantitative evaluation of the relative impact of the two poverty determining 
mechanisms, either in the abstract or for specific countries;  i.e. what would be the 
reduction in poverty for a given rate of growth and a given redistribution?  Were this 
question answered, one could then assess the growth and redistribution mechanisms in 
light of the resource cost of their poverty reducing impact. 
 To calculate the poverty-reducing impact of growth and redistribution, we use a 
simple analytical framework that formulates two abstract possibilities:  poverty reduction 
through distribution-neutral growth (DNG) and poverty reduction through a redistribution 
of each period’s growth increment (redistribution with growth, RWG).  These are 
compared to a conventional one-off redistribution of current income (RCY).  Without a 
dated poverty target, the question we address, which is more effective for poverty 
reduction, growth or redistribution, would be analytically trivial.  If a country’s per capita 
                                                 
6 This document was taken off the internet, without pagination.  Page numbers given here are 
based on numbering form the first pages of text (‘Introduction’). 
7 Evidence that the pattern of growth in both developed and developing countries became more 
unequal is presented in Cornia (1999). 
8 For further discussion of the achievability of the targets see Demery & Walton (1998) and 
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income lies above the designated poverty line and one ignores the practicalities of 
redistribution, poverty can be eliminated by a one-off redistribution in any current time 
period, while per capita growth would take several or many periods to achieve the same 
result.  The imposition of a specific target on the poverty agenda makes our calculations 
policy-relevant. 
 We can note that there is a further possibility, growth with a worsening 
distribution of income.  This outcome characterised many if not most of the countries in 
transition from central planning to market regulation during the 1990s (and China 
perhaps as early as the 1980s).  Clearly, such a growth pattern would reduce the poverty 
reducing potential of growth.  In effect, it represents a dynamic transfer from the poor to 
the non-poor.  In what follows we note but do not quantify this scenario.  This is because, 
first, its consequence for poverty is clear.   Second, we address ourselves to policy 
outcomes whose purpose is to reduce poverty in order to meet the International 
Development Targets.  For all of the countries covered by our empirical calculations, 
preventing a worsening distribution of income is a precondition to meet these targets. 
 
 
2. Analytical and Policy Framework 
 
 
 The evaluation of the effectiveness of growth and distribution for poverty 
reduction would be required even were it the case that for the vast majority of countries 
historical growth rates would achieve the poverty target (see van der Hoeven 2000).  Any 
target growth rate, in this case for poverty reduction, has an opportunity cost in foregone 
consumption compared to lower rates.  This real resource cost can be compared to the 
cost of achieving the same poverty reduction at a lower growth rate.  Economic growth is 
a means, and raising the rate of economic growth without considering the opportunity 
cost would be the domestic equivalent of mercantilism. 
  The relevance of the opportunity cost of raising growth rates passes from 
academic to practical interest because, for the vast majority of countries, maintaining 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hanmer & Nascold ( 2000). 
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historical growth rates would not be sufficient to meet the international poverty target.9  
Table 1, taken from Hanmer and Nascold (2000), demonstrates the inadequacy of past 
growth performances for the major developing regions.  Only for the East Asia and 
Pacific countries was growth above the rate necessary to reach the poverty target.  For the 
sub-Saharan region, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America, both long-run 
rates (1965-97) and growth in the 1990s were below what would be required to reach the 
poverty target with distribution-neutral growth.  In the case of South Asia, a relatively 
modest increase on the performance of the 1990s in per capita growth, of about twenty 
percent, would be sufficient.  Performance for the Central and Eastern European 
countries and central Asian countries would be more difficult to assess.  The pre-1990 
rates were sufficient, but the post-reform performance far below target.  It is probably the 
case that some of the Central and Eastern European countries would achieve the growth 
target, while the central Asian countries could not. 
For all the regions the opportunity cost of the target growth rates appears relevant 
in light of the substantial degree of income inequality (last column of the table).  To 
consider this further, an analytical framework is required in which ‘growth’ and 
‘redistribution’ are specified rigorously.  Using the absolute, internationally comparable 
poverty line discussed above, we employ a simple model to generate our empirical 
calculations.  We define the income distribution of a country over the adult population, 
which we divide into percentiles (hi), and the mean income of each percentile is Yi.  The 
distribution of current income conforms to the following two parameter function: 
(1)  Yi = Ahi
α 
 While this function will tend to be inaccurate at the ends of the distribution, its 
simplicity allows for a straight-forward demonstration of the interaction between 
distribution and growth.  Each country’s distribution differs by the degree of inequality 
(the parameter ) and the scalar A, which is determined by overall per capita income.  
Thus, 
(2)  A = β Ypc 
 and 
                                                 
9 A discussion of this issue is found in Demery & Walton (1998). 
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(3) Yi = β Ypchi
α 
 Total income is, by definition, 
(4) Z = m Σ βYpc hiα  for 1 = 1,2...100and m is the number of people in each 
percentile. 
 If the poverty line is Yp = P, we can solve for the percentile in which it falls, 
which is also the percentage in poverty (N).10   
(5) hp = N = [P/ β Ypc](1/
α) 
 If we differentiate N with respect to per capita income, we can express the 
proportional change in the percentage of the population in poverty in terms of the growth 
rate of GDP and the distributional parameters: 
(6) DN/N = n =  -y [1/α ][P/β](1/α) 
Equation 5 can be used to generate a family of iso-poverty curves, of decreasing 
level as they shift to the right, shown in Figure 1, on the assumption that α is constant.  
The diagram clarifies the policy alternatives:  redistribution of current income (RCY) 
involves a vertical (downward) movement, distribution neutral growth (DNG) a 
horizontal (rightward) shift, and RWG is represented by a vector lying between the two.  
The diagram also shows the case of increasing inequality growth (IIG), in which the 
growth of per capita income so worsens the distribution of income that it leaves poverty 
unchanged (movement along the constant poverty level curve for P = 20 percent).  
Perhaps too optimistically, we do not treat this as a planned outcome, since we address 
policies to reduce poverty.   
The diagram implies generalisations that will be demonstrated by the empirically-
based calculations in the next section.  First, because the schedules converge to the left, 
the impact of redistribution on poverty declines as per capita income declines.  At low 
incomes, both redistribution and redistribution with growth are less effective, relatively to 
distribution neutral growth. Second, for a given per capita income, the lower the level of 
inequality, the greater is the impact of redistribution on poverty reduction.  In other 
                                                 
10 A characteristic of this distribution function is that the two parameters, α and β, are not 
independent of each other.  This characteristic does not affect our calculations in the next section, 
because we use the function only for the initial period’s income. 
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words, when the poor are clustered close to the poverty line, the income transfer 
necessary to raise them out of poverty is less than if the same number of households were 
unequally distributed. 
 The growth-distribution interaction on poverty reduction can also be shown for 
growth rates, using equation 6.  In Figure 2, the percentage reduction in poverty is on the 
vertical axis and growth rates on the horizontal.  Three lines are shown, for increasing 
degrees of inequality as they rotate clockwise (increasing values of α holding initial per 
capita income constant).  The figure shows that for any initial per capita income, growth 
reduces poverty more, the less the inequality of initial income distribution.  From the 
initial position at point a, distribution neutral growth increases the rate of poverty 
reduction along the schedule α = 1.3 to point b (an increase in the growth rate with 
distribution unchanged), redistribution of current income involves a vertical movement to 
point c, and a shift from a to d is a case of redistribution with growth.   
 In anticipation of our empirical calculations, that will show redistribution to be 
more effective in reducing poverty than growth for a majority of countries (but not all), 
note that using a head count measure of absolute poverty has an inherent bias towards the 
effectiveness of growth alone (DNG).  Assuming all income distributions to be relatively 
continuous,11 any distribution neutral growth in per capita income, no matter how low, 
will reduce poverty.  However, redistribution reduces poverty only to the extent that it 
moves a person above a per capita income of US$ 365.  To put the point another way, 
redistributions that reduce the degree of income poverty for those below the absolute 
poverty standard do not qualify as poverty reducing.12  Even confronted with this strong 
condition, we show that simple redistribution rules result in powerful outcomes for 
poverty reduction.  The redistribution we propose, in the Chenery, et. al. (1974) 
tradition,13 is equal absolute increments across all percentiles, top to bottom.  This could 
be viewed as relatively minimalist, with alternative redistribution rules considerably more 
                                                 
11 That is, we assume there are no ‘gaps’ in the distribution below and near the poverty line. 
12 A redistribution of one percentage point of GDP from the richest ten percent of the population 
to the poorest ten percent, equally distributed among the latter, would improve raise the incomes 
of all those in the lowest decile, but might shift none of them above the poverty line. 
13 This volume was path breaking, in that it focused World Bank policy on strategies of poverty 
reduction.  Particularly important were two papers by Ahluwalia (1974a and 1974b), and by 
Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974a and 1974b).  A good review of the distribution literature of the 
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progressive.  This, a special case of the redistribution with growth strategy, we call equal 
distribution growth (EDG). 
 Assuming that the absence of a distribution policy implies distribution neutral 
growth, the proposed equal distribution growth implies income transfers, or an implicit 
policy-generated tax.  Let aggregate income in the base period be Z0 and in the next 
period Z1, and assume the latter is unchanged by how (Z1 – Z0) is distributed across 
percentiles.14  With distribution neutral growth the income in each percentile (Yi) 
increases by (Y0i [1 + y*]), where y* is the rate of per capita income growth (by 
definitional the same across the distribution).  Under equal distribution growth, each 
percentile receives an income increment of (Z1 – Z0)/100.  This post-transfer or 
secondary distribution of income by percentile is noted as Y1ie, for period 1.  Using the 
redistribution rule and our symbols, 
(7) Z1 = (1 + y*)Z0 = [ΣY1i], by definition, and 
Y1i
e = Y0i  + {[( y*)Z0]/100} =  Y0i  + E1 
Where Σ [Y1i] = Σ[Y1ie], by definition. 
 Defining Ti as the implicit redistribution tax for each percentile,  
(8) Ti = (Y1i  - Y1i
e)/(Y1i  - Y0i )  
The redistribution tax is negative up to the point of mean income (positive income 
transfer), then positive above (negative income transfer). If income were normally 
distributed, the tax would be negative through the fiftieth percentile.  It is obvious that the 
more skewed the distribution, the higher is the percentile associated with average per 
capita income (the fiftieth percentile being the lower bound).  Calculated by percentiles, 
we find that the redistribution tax is not out of line with rates that have applied in many 
developed countries.  For example, the extremely unequal Brazilian distribution for the 
1990s, with a Gini coefficient of 60,15 implies a marginal tax rate on the hundredth 
                                                                                                                                                 
1960s and 1970s is found in Fields (1980). 
14 This assumption is discussed in the section on policy. 
15 In this paper Gini coefficients will be reported on a scale of zero to one hundred. 
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percentile of slightly more than eighty percent, well below the maximum for such rates in 
the United States and Western Europe after World War II into the 1960s.  Further, if the 
redistribution is affected through growth policies rather than direct transfers, the so-call 
redistribution tax is implicit rather than levied. 
 The proposed marginal redistribution has characteristics that derive automatically 
from the nature of income distributions.  First, and most obvious, the relative benefits of 
the equal absolute additions to each income percentile increase as one moves down the 
income distribution.  Second, and as a result of the first, for any per capita income, the 
lower the poverty line, the greater will be the poverty reduction.  As a corollary, when a 
policy distinction is made between degrees of poverty, with different poverty lines, the 
marginal redistribution will reduce ‘severe’ poverty more than it reduces less ‘severe’ 
poverty.  Third, the more unequal the distribution of income below the poverty line, the 
less is the reduction in poverty for any increase in per capita income, or redistribution of 
that increase. 
 Before moving to our empirical investigation of alternative growth paths, it is 
appropriate briefly to comment on our ‘benchmark’ path, distribution neutral growth.  
Dollar and Kray (2000) reach the conclusion, based on cross-country regressions, that the 
typical outcome of the growth process in developing countries is to leave the income 
share of the lowest quintile unchanged;  ie., distribution neutral growth (see also 
Ravallion 2001).  The authors characterise this with the phrase, ‘growth is good for the 
poor’ (italics in the original).16  This statement has limited analytical content, for if the 
elasticity of the income share of the poor with respect to growth is positive, ‘growth is 
good for the poor’ by definition.  Why an elasticity of unity should be the borderline 
between growth being ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the poor is not clear;  indeed, it would seem 
arbitrary.  The policy issue is not whether growth is or is not good for the poor (it is 
except in a few circumstances), but what policy measures can make it better for the 
poor.17    
 
 
                                                 
16 The same point, that distribution neutral growth appears to be the norm, is demonstrated 
empirically in a much simpler way and with less fan-fare in Ferreira (1999). 
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3.  Redistribution with Growth:  Empirical Calculations 
 
 In this section we inspect the impact on poverty in fifty countries of three 
calculation exercises, corresponding to different distributional outcomes:  1) a one 
percent distribution neutral increase in per capita GDP;  2)  a one percent increase in per 
capita GDP, distributed equally across income percentiles;  and 3) a one percent 
redistribution of income from the richest twenty percent to the poorest twenty percent.  
The effectiveness of the outcomes in reducing poverty is judged by the time period 
required to reduce poverty by a given percentage.  This corresponds to the goal of the 
International Poverty Targets.  In all calculations the US one dollar a day ‘head count’ 
measure of poverty is used.  
 Before proceeding to the calculations, a warning is required about the use of the 
head country poverty measure, and of the relationship between per capita income and the 
poverty line.  Because we measure per capita income in constant US dollars and compare 
this statistic across countries, there is an assumption of purchasing power parity; i.e., that 
one-dollar per day measures the same standard of living in all the sample countries.  Even 
were it the case that income per capita in each country were normalised for purchasing 
power parity, it would not follow that the poverty bench mark, US$ 365, was equivalent. 
This would follow if and only if the vector of purchasing power equivalent prices was the 
same across the entire distribution.  Since the poor often pay different prices than the 
non-poor, and expenditure weights will vary across the distribution, the adjustment 
appropriate to per capita income would not necessarily apply at and below the poverty 
line. 
 Second, as explained below, we estimate the poverty line on the basis of a 
distribution function and GDP per capita.  In place of the latter one should use personal 
income (factor incomes plus transfer payments).  However, for most of the countries in 
the sample, personal income statistics are not available. These two problems, the 
problems with purchasing power parity across the distribution and use of GDP rather than 
personal income, affect the precision of our calculations, but not the general principle we 
seek to demonstrate.  The two problems imply that our calculations underestimate the 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 The Dollar and Kraay paper is considered in detail in Lübker, Smith and Weeks (2002). 
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poverty share in the sample countries.  However, once per capita income figures are 
chosen for countries and it is assumed that purchasing power parity prices are the same 
across the distribution, our conclusions about policy alternatives follow.  We could, for 
example, eliminate both problems by carrying out our exercise on a hypothetical number 
set composed of purchasing power parity personal incomes.  However, we chose base our 
calculations on real countries and the best available measures of per capita income and 
distribution. We judge the loss of precision to be outweighed by the gain in policy 
relevance. 
 The necessary condition for a country to be included in the calculations is that 
there were statistics on the income share for quintiles,18 and that the country was included 
in the World Bank’s estimates of absolute poverty.  The World Bank estimates were 
generated by converting each country’s per capita income to constant US dollars for a 
base year, then setting a poverty line of US one dollar a day.19  The specified poverty 
percentile for one dollar a day is implied by the assumptions made about the distribution 
of income within each quintile.   
 To estimate the impact of a change in income on the percentage of households in 
poverty, it is necessary to make explicit the implicit intra-quintile distribution of income.  
It was not necessary to know the distribution within all quintiles, but only for the quintile 
in which the poverty line fell, before and after the three calculations.  Our model implies 
the method of estimating the intra-quintile distribution (equation 5). To make the model 
more closely conform to each country’s distribution, we let the parameter α vary by 
quintile: α1 applies from the first quintile to the percentile that contains the mean income 
of the second quintile, α2 applies from that point to the mean income of the third quintile, 
α3 to the mean of the fourth quintile, and α4 for the rest of the distribution.  Except for 
very low income countries, the poverty line will fall into the first or second quintile, so 
only α1 and α2 need be estimated.  To estimate those we assume that in the relevant 
                                                 
18 The major source was the WIDER income distribution database.  See appendix for details by 
country. 
19 The World Bank also provides estimates of the population below two dollars day, but this 
measure is not used here.  The accuracy of these poverty levels is open to criticism (Karshenas 
2001).  For our purposes this is relatively unimportant, since the conclusions we reach are 
relatively insensitive to the exact level of estimated poverty in each country. 
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quintiles mean and median income are equal.  Empirical evidence indicates this to be a 
close approximation to actual distributions for the bottom two quintiles.20  Since we need 
to estimate the income distribution only in the relevant quintiles, our calculations do not 
use inequality measures for the distribution as a whole (e.g. Gini Coefficients).  Errors in 
our calculations would arise from inaccuracies in the estimation of quintile income shares 
rather than inaccuracies in measures of overall inequality. These inaccuracies in income 
shares could affect our categorising of countries, but not the general argument we 
develop on the basis of our calculations.  
A further note is necessary on the nature of the data and the consistency of the 
results. For some countries quintile shares were expenditure-based while for others they 
were income-based. However, this should not reduce the consistency of our results. 
Using mixed data of income-based and expenditure-based estimates can be problematic 
in studies that, for instance, aim to compare poverty levels across countries or in a 
specific country over time. 21 Our objective in this paper is to assess the relative 
effectiveness of a number of poverty reduction strategies. Our main reference is the 
estimates ‘effectiveness ratio’ which is not sensitive to the variation in the definition of 
data (income versus expenditure based).  
With these warnings made, we can use our assumptions to solve for the relevant 
quintile distribution parameters.  If Y(q1m) and Y(q2m) are the mean incomes of the first 
and second quintiles (both known), then 
(9) Y(q1m) = β[10.5]α1 
 Y(q2m) = β[30.5]α2 
 One solves for the initial poverty level as above (equation 5).22  After one percent 
distribution neutral growth in one time period, the income of that percentile rises by one 
percent (i.e., US$365x(1.01) = 368.85), and for equal distribution growth by the 
                                                 
20 We are indebted to Malte Lueker for demonstrating this to us, using data from several 
developing countries.  More details can be provided on request.  Our calculations are hardly 
affected by the degree to which the mean and medium incomes differ. 
21 A similar problem is observed for some of the Gini coefficients in Table 2 which seem of 
limited credibility; e.g. greater measured inequality for China than for India and Pakistan.  
22 The distribution parameters are not sensitive to the difference between mean and median 
income, unless the difference varies by quintile.  The parameter αi is determined by the share of 
income across quintiles. 
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increment in aggregate national income equally distributed across all percentiles (see 
equation 7).  With the income of the initial period’s poverty line percentile known for the 
next period, one can calculate the new poverty percentile (that is, the percentile for which 
Yi = US$ 365 in the second period). 
 Having explained the calculations, we turn to the empirical results.  Table 2 
provides the basic statistics for the calculations for the fifty countries:  per capita income, 
the Gini coefficient, and the percentage of the population with income per head below 
one US dollar (the poverty line), as estimated by the World Bank.  In Table 3, the 
calculations are reported, for the two growth exercises, distribution-neutral growth (DNG 
in the table) and equal distribution growth (EDG).  Columns one and two give the 
estimates of the percentile of households lifted out of US one dollar poverty as the result 
of one percent growth, distribution-neutral and equal-distribution, respectively.  Column 
three reports the ‘effectiveness of redistribution’ ratio. This is the ratio of poverty 
reduction for equal distribution growth to distribution neutral growth (column 1 divided 
by column 2).  This ratio is greater than unity for forty-seven of the fifty countries.  That 
is, for ninety-four percent of the countries, the equal distribution grow strategy reduces 
poverty more in a given time period than a distribution-neutral growth strategy.  This in 
itself is not surprising, for distribution-neutral growth is only more effective in reducing 
poverty for countries with fifty percent or more of the population below the poverty line.  
It is striking how much more effective equally distributed growth proves to be in 
reducing poverty for most countries.  For middle income countries the greater 
effectiveness of redistribution is quite clear:  for a large proportion, the effectiveness ratio 
is in excess of three;  ie., equal distribution growth raises three times as many households 
from poverty than distribution neutral growth over any time period.   
 The benefits of equal distribution growth are greater the higher is a country’s per 
capita income, and the more equal the distribution below the poverty line.  The results 
imply that growth with redistribution would be particularly appropriate for the Latin 
American countries and those of North Africa and the Middle East.  Its poverty-reducing 
advantage would be less for the sub-Saharan countries (except South Africa), because of 
their low per capita incomes.  Because the table includes only a few low-income 
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countries, it overstates the proportion of countries for which redistribution with growth is 
more effective than distribution neutral growth.   This over-emphasis is discussed below. 
 As the poverty line rises up a country’s income distribution, the effectiveness of 
redistribution ratio becomes less and less sensitive to measures of inequality.   However, 
it is always the case, no matter what a country’s per capita income or degree of inequality 
(if it is not zero), that redistribution with growth is more effective than distribution 
neutral growth in reducing the intensity of poverty (as opposed to the head count).  The 
relative benefit of equal distribution growth increases as one moves down the income 
distribution, independently of a country’s per capita income or degree of inequality.23 
 The redistribution with growth outcome implies a tax on all households whose 
income is above the mean.  In which percentile the mean falls depends on the skewedness 
of the distribution.  The final two columns (4 and 5) of Table 3 report the implied tax rate 
for the highest percentile, and the average rate across all percentiles whose income is 
redistributed towards the poorer percentiles.  This calculation presents the issue of the 
effect of the redistribution on incentives of positive and negative transfers.24  If 
distribution neutral growth represents the primary (pre-tax) outcome, and equal-
distribution growth the secondary (post-tax) outcome, then there is a straight-forward 
disincentive effect for those taxed, to be weighted against the incentive effect for the 
beneficiaries.  We make the assumption that the incentive effect of taxes is symmetrical:  
if positive tax rates create a disincentive to earn further income, then negative rates create 
an incentive to earn income and contribute to higher national growth.  If the income 
distribution is skewed, then the number of households enjoying an incentive to increase 
earnings will out-number those suffering a disincentive, and the impact on growth should 
be positive.  Whether this increases or decreases the growth rate would depend on the 
income-weighted average of the incentive effects. 
 These growth calculations can be compared to the more conventional exercise, a 
direct redistribution from the rich to the poor.  This is calculated in Table 4, where it is 
                                                 
23 However, in the 1990s inequality increased dramatically in most of these countries (Brundenius 
and Weeks 2001), marking them more like the Latin American group for purposes of poverty 
reduction analysis. 
24 The rates are marginal, not average, applying to the increase or growth increment in per capita 
income. 
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assumed that one percentage point of total national income is shifted from the top quintile 
to the poor, and distributed equally among those households.25  This assumption is 
equivalent to assuming that a one percent increase in GDP goes to those below the 
poverty line.  For each country the reduction in the poverty measure for the one percent 
redistribution appears in column two, and can be compared to column three in Table 2, 
where poverty prior to redistribution is given. The outcome is summarised in column 
three of Table 4, which reports the percentage reduction in poverty as the result of the 
redistribution.  For example, pre-redistribution poverty in Brazil was measured as 23.2 
percent of the population, and is simulated to be 18.4 percent after redistribution, for a 
fall of 20.7 percent (4.8 percentage points).  The final column of the table gives the 
implicit tax rates on the highest quintile resulting from the redistribution.  These prove to 
be quite low, varying from less than two percent to a high of three percent, inversely 
related to inequality (ie., the share of income accruing to the top quintile before 
redistribution). 
 The poverty reductions associated with redistribution of current income vary 
dramatically across countries.  In general, the lower the per capita income of a country, 
the less is the poverty reduction.  This is demonstrated clearly for the twelve Latin 
American countries, among which the reduction for the Central American states and 
Ecuador is virtually nil.  The other obvious influence is inequality.  Holding per capita 
income constant, the lower inequality just below the poverty line, the greater the poverty 
reduction from a redistribution.  Comparing the middle-income Latin American countries 
to the former centrally planned countries reveals this. 
 These results suggest a typology of countries based on the general strategy that is 
most conducive to poverty reduction, shown in Table 5.  Columns two and three give the 
number of years required for distribution neutral growth and equal distribution growth to 
achieve the same poverty reduction as a transfer of one percent of national income from 
the highest to the lowest quintile.  To take the first country, Venezuela, distribution 
neutral growth would require over thirty-four years to reduce poverty by the same 
amount as the one percentage point redistribution, and equal distribution growth would 
                                                 
25 At the poverty boundary, this redistribution shifts some households above the ones with slightly 
higher pre-redistribution incomes, but this does not affect the conclusions reached in the text. 
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require six years. On the basis of these calculations, the fifty countries fall into three 
categories.  In category 1, the ‘income redistribution countries’, both growth strategies 
require more than one year to reduce poverty as much as a straight redistribution.  The 
countries are listed in descending order of the number of years required for distribution-
neutral growth to match the impact of the one percent redistribution on poverty.  For 
thirty-four of the fifty countries (sixty-eight percent), straight redistribution is the most 
effective method of poverty reduction.  
 In category 2 are thirteen ‘redistribution with growth’ countries, for which 
redistribution is not the most effective poverty reduction strategy, and equal distribution 
growth is more effective than distribution-neutral growth.  This is emphasised by 
inclusion of the ‘effectiveness ratio’ in the final column (taken from Table 3).  These 
countries are characterised either by low per capita income or relatively equal distribution 
(or some combination of the two). Finally, there is category 3, three ‘trickle down’ 
countries, for which growth as such is the most effective vehicle for poverty reduction.  
The defining characteristic of the trickle down countries is that they have more than fifty 
percent of their population in poverty as a result of their low per capita income.  
However, it does not follow that all low income countries would fall into this category.  If 
low income is combined with a relatively equal distribution, as for Niger, equal 
distribution growth may be more effective in reducing poverty, if only marginally so in 
that specific case. 
 The calculations demonstrate that for the majority of middle-income countries, 
poverty reduction is most effectively achieved by a redistribution of current income.  For 
the same countries, redistribution with growth would be the second-best option, and 
distribution neutral, or status quo growth, a poor third.  Figure 3 demonstrates the 
relationship between the three poverty strategies and levels of per capita income, for a 
given level of overall inequality.   The graph is constructed using a regression algorithm 
and the fifty countries in our tables.  For each country, the number of years required for 
distribution neutral growth or redistribution with growth to achieve the same poverty 
reduction as redistribution of current income is estimated as function of per capita income 
and the Gini coefficient.  The regression equations are only a rough approximation, since 
the Gini is a crude proxy for the slope of the distribution function just below the poverty 
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line (implied by the parameter α in our model).26  Using the regressions, two curves are 
shown, for DNG and RWG, respectively, for a Gini of 40 (close to the average value 
across the fifty countries).  DNG and RWG are judged as less effective than 
redistribution of current income if they require more than one year to achieve the same 
percentage point reduction in poverty.  
The graph indicates that redistribution with growth becomes more effective when 
per capita income falls below about US$ 700, and distribution neutral growth replaces it 
as most effective when per capita income drops below about US$ 450.  While the curves 
are only indicative (inequality varies across countries), they demonstrate the following 
general points:  1) for middle-income countries redistribution of current income is the 
most effective method of poverty reduction;  2) for very low income countries, 
distribution neutral growth is most effective, and 3) the per capita income range for 
which redistribution with growth is most effective is quite narrow, though it is more 
effective than DNG except at very low per capita incomes.   
In principle, the analogue used to generate Figure 3 could be employed to divide 
all countries as we have done for the fifty in Table 5.  However, this cannot be done with 
precision in practice, due to lack of distributional data and the problem of consistently 
measuring per capita income across countries and over time.  A very rough estimate of 
the number of countries in the three categories is possible.  If we assume that the Gini 
coefficients for the countries not in Table 5 lie between 40 and 50, the relevant 
‘borderline’ countries are Senegal (lowest among the redistribution of current income 
countries) and Niger (lowest among the redistribution with growth countries).  We order 
all developing countries by per capita income using the latest World Bank World 
Development Indicators (data for 1999), and treat these two countries as the appropriate 
                                                 
26 The regression algorithms are as follows, where A(DNG) and A(EDG) are the number of years 
to achieve the equivalent of a redistribution of current income, PCY is per capita income, and G 
is the Gini coefficient.  The significance of coefficients is given in parenthesis below the 
coefficients, and relevant other statistics below them. 
 A(DNG) =  -79.08 + 10.77ln(PCY) + 3.55ln(G) 
                                    (.01)      (.01)                   (.10) 
  R2 = .47   F = 19.8    N = 47 
 
 A(EDG) = -6.38 +  2.91ln(PCY) – 2.94ln(G) 
                                 (nsgn)    (.01)                 (.01) 
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boundaries for the three categories of poverty reduction strategies.  Using this rough 
method, of 132 developing countries the count is the following: redistribution of current 
income would be most effective for sixty-five;  redistribution with growth for twenty; and 
distribution neutral growth for the remaining forty-seven.  If a political judgement 
rejected redistribution of current income, then two-thirds of the countries should, on 
technical grounds, pursue a poverty reduction strategy that purposefully seeks to alter the 
distribution of the increment in growth.  These eighty or more countries include all the 
middle-income countries, almost all the European and Asian countries in transition, and 
many of the low-income countries.  On the other hand, for almost all countries in the 
United Nations category of Least Developed Countries a distribution neutral growth path 
would be the most poverty reducing.  With these generalisations in mind, we consider 
poverty reduction policies in the following section. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
  Adjusted R2 = .49   F = 20.1   N = 47 
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5.  Policy Effectiveness for Redistribution with Growth 
 
 
 The major element required to introduce and effectively implement a re-
distributive strategy in any country is the construction of a broad political coalition for 
poverty reduction (see Bell 1974).  The task of this coalition would be the formidable one 
of pressuring governments for redistribution policies, while neutralising opposition to 
those policies from groups whose self-interest rests with the status quo.  How such a 
political coalition might come about is specific to each country and its discussion beyond 
the scope of this paper.  We focus on a less fundamental, but crucially practical issue:  the 
policies that could bring about a redistribution strategy.  To be policy relevant, our 
consideration of redistribution mechanisms must move beyond a listing of possibilities to 
an analysis of the likely effectiveness of these.   
 First, the question of effectiveness should be considered on the macro level, by 
returning to the question raised in the first section:  what are the opportunity costs of 
reducing poverty by increasing the growth rate and implementing redistribution?  The 
opportunity cost of implementation will be determined by the specifics of the programme 
to achieve redistribution, the size of the redistribution, and the administrative capacity of 
the public sector.  None of these can be determined in the abstract.  However, the 
opportunity cost of raising the growth rate can be quantified within broad limits.  From 
equation six, we have: 
 n =  -y [1/α][P/β](1/α) 
 The consumption foregone to achieve any growth rate y is determined by the 
familiar equation, y = sv, where s is the net saving rate and v is the output-capital ratio.  
The opportunity cost of lowering poverty through growth alone can be indicated using 
the calculations for the Latin American countries.  Table 3 shows that a distribution 
neutral growth rate of one percent reduces poverty by .32 percentage points, while equal 
distribution growth would achieve the same reduction with a growth rate of .26 
percentage points.  To double the distribution neutral growth reduction of poverty would 
require an increase of the saving rate of the amount (1/v).  If the capital-output ratio is 
approximately four, then increasing the annual rate of poverty reduction by one 
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percentage point calls for an increase in the saving rate of four percentage points.  Equal 
distribution growth would achieve the same poverty reduction with one percentage point 
increase in the saving rate.  The difference in the required changes in the saving rate 
implies that equal distribution growth would have a substantially lower opportunity cost 
of poverty reduction (three percentage points of GDP).   
Therefore, equal distribution growth would be a more economically efficient way 
to reduce poverty as long as its administrative cost did not exceed three percentage points 
of GDP.  To continue with the example for the Latin American region, equal distribution 
growth of one percent for one period would redistribute half of one percent of national 
income.  If this small redistribution could be achieved with an administrative outlay of 
less than three percentage points of national income, then EDG would be more effective 
than DNG. 
 The opportunity cost of the two growth patterns is demonstrated in Figure 4.  The 
increase in the saving rate required to raise the growth rate one percentage point is equal 
to the capital-output ratio.  As an approximation, it is assumed that the capita-output ratio 
is an increasing function of per capita income.  We assume that the ratio is three for the 
poorest country of the fifty (Zambia), and 4.5 for the country with the richest (Thailand), 
and increases linearly with per capita income.  This, shown by the straight line DNG, is 
compared to an increase in the saving ratio for the equal distribution growth rate that 
generates the same percentage point poverty reduction.  For all but nine countries (noted 
in the chart), the ‘savings gap’ between DNG and EDG increases with per capita income.  
Seven of these were countries in transition from central planning, with low initial poverty 
and/or low inequality.  To summarise:  1) the opportunity cost of lowering poverty 
through growth alone rises with per capita income;  and 2) the likelihood that the 
administrative costs of redistribution would render EDG as or more expensive than DNG 
decreases with per capita income.  Arguments that assert that redistribution to be ‘too 
expensive’ appear unfounded when one that considers the opportunity cost of reducing 
poverty through growth alone.27 
                                                 
27 For any particular programme, administrative costs would have to be carefully calculated and 
compared to those of alternative policies.  There is relatively little work on this topic.  For a case 
study, see Grosh (1995). 
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Turning to specific measures for redistribution, perhaps the most important 
determinant of the effectiveness of the various measures of each redistribution strategy is 
the structure of an economy.  This structure depends on the level of development, which 
will to a great extent condition the country’s production mix, the endowments of socio-
economic groups, the remuneration to factors, direct and indirect taxes on income and 
assets, prices paid for goods and services, and transfer payments.  These elements of the 
distribution system are initial conditions that delineate the scope for redistributive 
policies.  The implementation requirements of redistributive policies can be summarised 
in a simple algebraic framework (see Hanmer et.al. 1997).  Define the following terms:  
Y denotes the income of a household, V is transfer payments, T is taxes, k is a 
vector of assets (including human capital), w is a vector of rates of return 
(including wages), p is the price vector of goods and services, q is the quantity 
vector of those goods and services, and S is household saving. 
 By definition, 
 Y = (V – T) +    wk = pq +  S 
  Transfer payments 
(unemployment 
compensation, 
pensions, child 
benefits, aid to 
disabled) & 
progressive taxes (on 
income and wealth)  
 
 
 
 
Effective in middle-
income countries 
Minimum wages, 
low-wage 
subsidies, other 
labour market 
regulations, public 
employment 
schemes (w); 
credit programmes 
for the poor; land 
reform, education 
(k); 
 
Effective in 
middle-income 
and some low-
income countries 
 Subsidies for 
basic needs 
goods, public 
sector infra-
structure invest-
ment (p); child 
nutrition 
programmes (q) 
 
 
 
 
Effective in most 
countries 
Facilitate future 
asset acquisition: 
‘village banks’ & 
other financial 
services for the 
poor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effective in most 
countries 
 
 The effectiveness of tax and expenditure policies (V and T) to generate secondary 
and tertiary distributions more equitable than the primary distribution depends upon the 
relative importance of the formal sector.28  This is because governments can most 
effectively apply progressive income taxes to wage employees and corporations.  All 
empirical evidence shows that the formal sector wage bill and profit shares increase with 
                                                 
28 For a review of fiscal policies for redistribution, see Chu, Davoodi & Gupta 1999). 
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the level of development.  Along with the importance of the formal sector goes 
urbanisation, and working-poor urban households are more easily targeted than either the 
rural poor or urban informal sector households.  The experience of a number of middle-
income countries has demonstrated the effectiveness of basic income payments for 
poverty reduction, with an example being the basic pension paid to the elderly in South 
Africa.29 
 A redistribution strategy is most appropriate for middle-income countries, because 
their per capita incomes are high relatively to the absolute poverty line.  These are also 
the countries whose economic structures make taxation and expenditure instruments 
effective for redistribution.  Thus, the thirty-seven ‘income redistribution’ countries, and 
others at similar levels of development, qualify for the redistributive strategy via fiscal 
policy, both in terms of its intrinsic effectiveness and the institutional capacity to 
implement it.  Such countries would include the larger ones in Latin America (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela), several Asian ones (the Republic of Korea, 
Thailand, and Malaysia), and virtually all former socialist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 Specific economic structures can allow for effective use of taxation for 
redistribution in a few low-income countries that would typically be relevant only for 
middle-income countries.  If the economy of a low-income country is dominated by 
petroleum or mineral production, then modern sector corporations may generate a large 
portion of national income.  This allows for effective taxation even though administrative 
capacity of the public sector may be limited.  The tax revenue can be redistributed 
through poverty-reduction programmes, though not through transfer payments if the 
labour force is predominantly rural.  Examples of mineral-rich low-income countries with 
the potential to have done this, albeit unrealised, were Nigeria and Zambia.  
 Interventions to change the distribution of earned income (wk in the equation 
above), which alter market outcomes, will also tend to be more effective in middle-
income countries (ILO 1992).  The most common intervention is a minimum wage, 
though there are many other policies to improve earnings from work (see Rogers 1995).  
                                                 
29 While relatively low, the pension in the 1990s was an important income source for the both 
urban and rural poor, especially for female-headed households  (see Standing, Sender and Weeks 
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Further mechanisms include public employment schemes and tax subsidies to enterprises 
to hire low-wage labour.  It is unlikely that any of these would be effective in low-income 
countries, because of enforcement problems (minimum wage), targeting difficulties 
(employment schemes), and narrowness of impact (wage subsidies).  
 Land reform might achieve poverty reduction for rural households, but the 
relationship between land redistribution and level of development is a complex one.  On 
the one hand, low-income countries are predominantly rural, so if land ownership is 
concentrated, its redistribution could have a substantial impact on poverty.  The more 
underdeveloped a country, the less commercialised tend to be poor rural households.  
Therefore, the benefits to the poor from land redistribution in low-income countries are 
less likely to be contingent on support services.  On the other hand, lack of administrative 
capacity and so-called traditional tenure systems represent substantial constraints to land 
redistribution, especially in the sub-Saharan countries.  The usual approach to land 
redistribution presupposes that it is legally clear from whom the land will be taken and to 
whom it will be given.  There are few sub-Saharan countries in which private ownership 
is widespread, making redistribution difficult or impossible without prior clarification of 
ownership claims (Platteau 1992, 1995).  While land redistribution is probably not an 
effective poverty reducing measure for most low-income countries, a few notable 
exceptions in Asia (e.g., India and Vietnam) suggest that it should not be ruled out. 
 Experience in Latin America has shown that governments can effectively 
implement land redistribution, though subsequent poverty reduction is dependent on 
provision of rural support services (Thiesenhusen 1989), including agricultural extension 
and marketing facilities.  Perhaps more serious, the relevance of land reform for poverty 
reduction tends to decline as countries develop and the rural population shrinks.  At the 
end of the twentieth century in the five most populous Latin American countries, twenty 
percent or less of the labour force was in agriculture.  Minimum wages may be more 
relevant than land redistribution in reducing poverty among the landless and near-
landless in such countries.30   
                                                                                                                                                 
1996, Chap 6). 
30 This is particularly the case if there are no output gains from land redistribution;  i.e., if the so-
called inverse size rule does not hold (see Dyer 1997). 
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 Interventions that directly affect the prices and access to goods and services (pq) 
could potentially be quite powerful instruments for poverty reduction.  Subsidies to 
selected commodities have the administrative advantage of not requiring targeting, only 
identification of those items that carry a large weight in the expenditure of the poor.  
While multilateral adjustment programmes typically require an end to such subsidies on 
grounds of allocative efficiency or excessive budgetary cost, the rules of the World Trade 
Organisation do not, as long as subsidies do not discriminate between domestic 
production and imports (FAO 1998).  Whether subsidies would generate excessive fiscal 
strain would depend on the products covered and financing.  Again, the level of 
development of a country is of central importance for the effectiveness of subsidies.  In 
low-income countries with the majority of the poor in the countryside, consumer 
subsidies are unlikely to have a significant impact on the poor outside urban areas.  Basic 
goods provision in kind can be an effective instrument for poverty reduction even in very 
low-income countries, by delivering such items as milk to school children.  To do so with 
a non-targeted programme would probably require a progressive tax, which would be 
more likely in a middle-income country. 
 In all countries the poor suffer from poor health and inadequate education 
relatively to the non-poor.  Expenditures on infrastructure, education and health have the 
practical advantage that programmes that would help the poor are easily identified, 
though the specifics would vary by country.  Targeting these to the poor may in some 
countries be as politically difficult as more obviously controversial measures such as 
asset redistribution.   
 Table 6 provides a summary of the discussion, with poverty-reducing measures 
listed by rows, and the three categories of countries across columns.  The table indicates 
that for the ‘redistribution’ countries, a transfer of current income and assets is the most 
effective means of poverty reduction, and the methods to achieve this are feasible.  For 
these countries redistribution is not an alternative to growth;  rather it is a feasible and 
effective complement to growth.  For the ‘redistribution with growth’ countries, the 
measures for transfer of current income and assets are less feasible, but the more modest 
goal of redistributing the growth increment would be feasible.  Finally, most 
redistribution instruments would not be feasible for very low-income countries. 
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 An agenda of redistribution involves major problems, but these problems should 
not be exaggerated.  They might prove no more intractable than the problems associated 
with implementation of other economic policies.  An effective orthodox monetary policy 
is difficult to implement if a country is too small or underdeveloped to have a bond 
market (e.g. inability to ‘sterilise’ foreign exchange flows).  Similarly, replacing tariffs by 
a value added tax would be a daunting task in a country whose commerce was primarily 
through small traders. Lack of public sector capacity would limit the ability to execute a 
range of so-called supply side policies:  privatisation, ‘transparency’ mechanisms’, and 
decentralisation of central government service delivery (van der Hoeven and van der 
Geest 1999).  The multilateral agencies have recognised these constraints to adjustment 
programmes, and typically made the decision that constrained implemented was 
preferable to non-implementation.  The same argument can be made for a redistributive 
growth strategy:  to achieve poverty reduction, it might preferable to implement re-
distributive growth imperfectly than to implement the status quo imperfectly. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 Poverty reduction has been a priority of development policy, albeit sometimes 
only at the rhetorical level.  The end of the 1990s brought increased emphasis on bringing 
the benefits of growth to the poor (Rodrik 1994, Alesina 1998, Bruno, Ravallion & 
Squire 1998).  However, growth alone is a rather blunt instrument for poverty reduction, 
since the consensus of empirical work suggests that typically it is distribution neutral.  
Along with emphasis on poverty reduction, a shift occurred in the literature towards a 
more favourable view of policies to redistribution income and assets.  An integration of 
distributional concerns and priority on poverty reduction could be the basis for a new 
policy agenda to foster both growth and equity. 
 This new agenda would be based on three analytical generalisations:  1) that 
greater distributional equality provides a favourable ‘initial condition’ for rapid and 
sustainable growth;  2) that redistribution of current income and assets, or redistribution 
of an economy’s growth increment is the most effective form of poverty reduction for 
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most countries;  3) the mechanisms to achieve the redistributions are feasible for most 
countries;  and 4) the administrative costs of these mechanisms are highly unlikely to 
cancel out the gains in poverty reduction.  These generalisations imply that the new 
agenda could focus upon specific policies and instruments of redistribution, with the goal 
of substantial reductions in urban and rural poverty in the medium term.  To reduce 
poverty, growth is not enough, nor is redistribution enough.  Required is a growth policy 
that incorporates equity as a fore-thought, rather than an after-thought, by shifting the 
ideological debate so that the costs and limits of growth are viewed as sceptically as the 
costs and limits of redistribution. 
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Figure 1: 
Relationship between Inequality and Per Capita Income 
for Constant Levels of Headcount Poverty
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Figure 2: 
Poverty Reduction and GDP Growth 
for Degrees of Inequality
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Figure 3 
Effectiveness of Poverty Reduction Strategies, NDG & RWG, 
for Given Levels of Inequality (from cross-country regression) 
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Figure 4 
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Table 1: Growth Rates Required to halve poverty by 2015 and Income Shares 
Region Per capita 
rates: 
growth    
Target
 
minus* 
 
Item: 
 
Region 
To meet 
target 
2000-15 
 
Actual 
1965-97 
 
Actual 
1990-97 
 
Actual 
1965-97 
 
Actual 
1990-97 
Income 
share, top 
20% 
Sub-Sahara 5.9 -0.2 -0.7 6.1 6.6 52 
ME & NA 2.8 0.1 0.7 2.7 2.1 na 
EAP 3.5 5.4 7.7 -1.9 -2.2 44 
South Asia 3.9 2.3 3.3 1.6 0.6 40 
LAC 7.0 1.3 2.1 5.7 4.9 53 
EE&CA 3.8 3.2 -4.1 0.6 7.9 na 
Notes: 
ME&NA – Middle East and North Africa 
EAP – East and the Pacific 
LAC – Latin America & the Caribbean 
EE&CA – Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
*A negative number indicates that the region grew faster than the rate necessary to meet the 
poverty target. 
Sources:  Growth rates, Hanmer & Nascold (2000); income share, Deininger & Squire (1996), for 
the 1990s; and DFID (2000, pp. 16 & 22), where the numbers are reproduced.  Similar 
calculations can be found in World Bank (2000) and World Bank  (2001a). 
 
Tables 2-5 in excel file. 
 
Table 6:  Summary of Feasibility of Redistribution Instruments by Category of Country 
Country 
Category: 
Redistributive 
Instrument: 
Redistribution of  
current income & assets 
(middle-income 
countries) 
Growth with 
redistribution policies 
(middle & most low-
income countries) 
Growth without 
redistribution policies 
(very low-income 
countries) 
Progressive 
taxation 
 
Yes 
Yes for  
some countries 
 
No 
Transfer 
payments 
 
Yes 
Yes for  
some countries 
 
No 
Consumer 
subsidies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes for  
some countries 
Land  
reform 
Yes, but not 
 always relevant 
 
Yes 
Not for  
most countries 
Education & 
health 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Infrastructure 
& public works 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
 
 
